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ROBERT L. SINSHEIMER 
The Presumptions of Science 
Can there be "forbidden"?or, as I prefer, "inopportune" knowledge? Could 
there be knowledge, the possession of which, at a given time and stage of social 
development, would be inimical to human welfare?and even fatal to the fur 
ther accumulation of knowledge? Could it be that just as the information latent 
in the genome of a developing organism must be revealed in an orderly pattern, 
else disaster ensue, so must our knowledge of the universe be acquired in a 
measured order, else disaster ensue? 
Biological organisms are equipped with many sensors essential to their sur 
vival, sensors for heat, cold, pain, thirst, hunger. Social organisms similarly 
need sensors of peril, particularly as they evolve into new domains?and for 
these we must use our intelligence, limited as it may be. 
Discussion of the possible restraint of inquiry touches a most sensitive nerve 
in the academic community. If one believes that the highest purpose available to 
humanity is the acquisition of knowledge (and in particular of scientific knowl 
edge, knowledge of the natural universe), then one will regard any attempt to 
limit or direct the search for knowledge as deplorable?or worse. 
If, however, one believes that there may be other values to be held even 
higher than the acquisition of knowledge?for instance, general human wel 
fare?and that science and possible other modes of knowledge acquisition 
should subserve these higher values, then one is willing to (indeed, one must) 
consider such issues as: the possible restriction of the rate of acquisition of scien 
tific knowledge to an "optimal" level relative to the social context into which it is 
brought; the selection of certain areas of scientific research as more or less ap 
propriate for that social context; the relative priorities at a given time of the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge or of other knowledge such as the ef 
fectiveness of modes of social integration, or of systems of justice, or of educa 
tional patterns. 
In short, if one does not regard the acquisition of scientific knowledge as an 
unquestioned ultimate good, one is willing to consider its disciplined direction. 
One may, of course, still have grave doubt as to whether mankind can know 
enough to be able intelligently to guide the rate or direction of the scientific 
endeavor, but at least one will then accept that we have a responsibility to seek 
answers?if there be any?to such questions. 
23 
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The Impact of Science 
In 1930 Robert A. Millikan, Nobel Prize winner, founder and long-time 
leader of Caltech, wrote in an article entitled "The Alleged Sins of Science" that 
one may "sleep in peace with the consciousness that the Creator has put some 
foolproof elements into his handiwork, and that man is powerless to do it any 
titanic physical damage."1 
To what was Millikan referring? Stimulated by the recombinant DNA con 
troversy, I have looked back to see if there were any similar admonitions or 
premonitions with respect to the possible consequences of nuclear energy. And 
there were. Millikan, in 1930, was responding to an earlier writing of Frederick 
Soddy. In a book entitled Science and Life Soddy, who had been a collaborator of 
Rutherford, had written: 
Let us suppose that it became possible to extract the energy which now oozes out, 
so to 
speak, from radioactive material over a period of thousands of millions of 
years, in as short a time as we pleased. From a pound weight of such substance one 
could get about as much energy as would be obtained by burning 150 tons of coal. 
How 
splendid. Or a pound weight could be made to do the work of 150 tons of 
dynamite. Ah, there's the rub 
... It is a discovery that conceivably might be 
made tomorrow in time for its development and perfection, for the use or destruc 
tion, let us say, of the next generations, and, which it is pretty certain, will be 
made by science sooner or later. Surely it will not need this actual demonstration 
to convince the world that it is doomed if it fools with the achievements of science 
as it has fooled too long in the past. 
War, unless in the meantime man has found a better use for the gifts of science, 
would not be the lingering agony it is today. Any selected section of the world, or 
the whole of it if necessary, could be depopulated with a swiftness and dispatch 
that would leave 
nothing to be desired.2 
Millikan commented, just prior to his statement quoted above, "Since Mr. Sod 
dy raised the hobgoblin of dangerous quantities of available subatomic energy 
[science] has brought to light good evidence that this particular hobgoblin?like 
most of the hobgoblins that crowd in on the mind of ignorance?was a 
myth . . . The new evidence born of further scientific study is to the effect that 
it is highly improbable that there is any appreciable amount of available sub 
atomic energy to tap."3 
So much for scientific prophecy. But it is indeed instructive and also trou 
bling to recognize that our scientific endeavor truly does rest upon unspoken, 
even 
unrecognized, faith?a faith in the resilience, even the benevolence, of 
nature as we have probed it, dissected it, rearranged its components in novel 
configurations, bent its forms and diverted its forces to human purpose. Scien 
tific endeavor rests upon the faith that our scientific probing and our tech 
nological ventures will not displace some key element of our protective 
environment and thereby collapse our ecological niche. It is a faith that nature 
does not set booby traps for unwary species. 
Our bold scientific thrusts into new territories uncharted by experiment and 
unencompassed by theory must rely wholly upon our faith in the resilience of 
nature. In the past that faith has been justified and rewarded, but will it always 
be so? The faith of one era is not always appropriate to the next, and an unex 
amined faith is unworthy of science. Ought we step more cautiously as we 
explore the deeper levels of matter and life? 
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Most states of nature are quasiequilibria, the outcome of competing forces. 
Small deviations from equilibrium, the result of natural processes or human 
intervention, are most often countered by an opposing force and the equilibri 
um restored, at some rate dependent upon the kinetics of the processes, the sizes 
of the relevant natural pools of components, and other factors. Although we 
may therefore speak of the resilience of nature, this restorative capacity is finite 
and is limited in rate. 
For example, if the ozone layer of the atmosphere is lightly and transiently 
depleted by a nuclear explosion or the atmospheric release of fluorocarbons, the 
natural processes which generate the ozone layer can restore it to the original 
level within a brief period. However, should the ozone layer be massively de 
pleted?as by extended, large-scale release of fluorocarbons?many decades 
would be required for its renewal by natural processes, even if the release of 
fluorocarbons ceased. 
Similiarly, the populations of most living creatures can achieve an equilibri 
um level dependent upon birth rates and upon death rates from various causes. 
Most species have an excess capacity for reproduction, so that minor additions 
to the process of their removal (as by the harvesting of fish) cannot appreciably 
influence the equilibrium population. Patently however, excessive harvesting 
removing numbers beyond the reproductive capacity of the species will in time 
bring about its extinction. 
In a similar manner lakes and rivers and air basins can absorb and dispose of 
limited amounts of pollutant but can be overwhelmed by masses beyond their 
capacity. Once overwhelmed the very agents responsible for disposal of pollu 
tion in small quantities may be destroyed, leaving a "dead" sea. 
The concept of resilience extends to the planet as a whole and to the impact 
upon the manifold equilibria upon which the network of life forms depends as 
we continue to 
expand our intensive monoculture agriculture, 
as we continue to 
increase the total of human energy consumption (the man-made release of ener 
gy in the Los Angeles basin is now estimated at about 5 percent of the solar 
input), as we continue to raise the atmospheric level of C02 by combustion of 
fossil fuel, and so forth. 
Because human beings (and most creatures) are adapted by evolution to the 
near equilibrium states, the resilience provided by the restorative forces of na 
ture has 
appeared to us to be not only benevolent, but unalterable. Less overt 
than our faith in the resilience of nature is the faith with which we have relied 
upon the resilience of our social institutions and their capacity to contain the 
stress of change and to adapt the knowledge gained by science?and the power 
inherent in that knowledge?to the benefit of society, more than to its detri 
ment. The fragility of the equilibria underlying social institutions is even more 
apparent than of the equilibria of nature. Political, economic, and cultural bal 
ances have shifted drastically in human history under the impact of new tech 
nologies, or new ideologies or religions, of invading peoples, of resource 
exhaustion, and other changes. Our faith in the resilience of both natural and 
man-made phenomena is increasingly strained by the acceleration of technical 
change and the magnitude of the powers deployed. 
Physics and chemistry have given us the power to reshape the physical na 
ture of the planet. We wield forces comparable to, even greater than those of, 
natural catastrophes. And now biology is bringing to us a comparable power 
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over the world of life. The recombinant DNA technology, while significant and 
potentially a grievous hazard in itself (through the conceivable production, by 
design or by inadvertance, of new human, animal, or plant pathogens or of 
novel forms capable of disrupting important biological equilibria), must be seen 
as a portent of things to come. 
The present recombinant DNA technology, which permits the addition or 
replacement of a few genes in living cells, is but the first prototype of genetic 
engineering. More powerful means involving cell fusion or chromosome trans 
fer are already close to hand; even more sophisticated future developments ap 
pear assured. Since genes determine the basic structures and biological 
potentials of all living forms, the ultimate potential of genetic engineering for 
the modification and redesign of plants and animals to meet human needs and 
desires seems virtually unlimited. 
Such capabilities will pose major questions as to the extent to which man 
kind will want to assume the responsibility for the life forms of the planet. 
Further, there is no reason to believe the same technology will not be applicable 
to mankind as well; the capability of human genetic engineering will raise pro 
found questions of values and judgment for human societies. 
It seems paradoxical that a living organism emergent from the evolutionary 
process after billions of years of blind circumstance should undertake to deter 
mine its own future evolution. The process is perhaps analogous to that of the 
mind seeking to understand itself. In both cases it is uncertain whether the 
attempt can possibly be successful. Nonetheless, at this point perhaps we had 
best step back and reconsider what it is we are about. 
For four centuries science has progressively expanded our knowledge and 
reshaped our perception of the world. In that same time technology has corre 
spondingly reshaped the pattern of our lives and the world in which we live. 
Most people would agree that the 
net 
consequence of these activities has 
been benign. But it may be that the conditions which fostered such a benign 
outcome of scientific advance and technological innovation are changing to a 
less favorable set. Changes in the nature of science or technology or in the 
external 
society?in either the scale of events 
or their temporal order?can af 
fect the preconditions, the presumptions, of scientific activity, and can thus 
alter the future consequences of such activities. 
Both quantitative and qualitative changes have surely affected the impact of 
science and technology upon society. Quantitatively, the exponential growth of 
scientific activity and the unprecedented magnitude of modern industrial ven 
tures permit the introduction of new technologies (e.g., fluorocarbon sprays) on 
a massive scale within very brief periods often with unforeseen consequence. 
Qualitatively, science and technology have been directed increasingly to syn 
thesis?to the formulation of new substances designed for specific human pur 
pose. Thus we have synthetic atoms (plutonium, strontium-90), synthetic 
molecules (dioxin, kepone, DDT) and now synthetic microorganisms (recombi 
nant DNA). In these activities we introduce wholly novel substances into the 




Can we continue to rely upon the past four centuries as a guide for scientific 
activity, given these changes? Other human activities of this same era are now 
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increasingly seen in a different hue. The same period witnessed exponential 
increases in population and in the exploitation of natural resources for material 
wealth. Few would argue continuance of such trends will be benign.4 The same 
era has witnessed the constant acceleration of the rate of change, the increasing 
dominance of technology in the affairs of men. 
The 
constantly accelerating accretion of knowledge, therefore, may 
not al 
ways be counted as a good. Can circumstances change so 
as to devalue the net 
worth of new knowledge? Might a pause or slowdown for consolidation and 
reflection then be more in order? Indeed, could it be that some knowledge 
could, at this time, be positively malign? Hard questions, perhaps not answer 
able, perhaps not the right questions, but they are not answered for 1977 by 
invoking Galileo or Darwin or Freud. I believe they demand our thought. 
I would advance for consideration some propositions that frankly I'm not at 
all sure I entirely believe. I think that in order to find out what one does believe 
it is necessary to go beyond what one can readily accept?to explore honestly 
more extreme and more remote positions 
so that one's position is based upon 
intelligent choice, not simple ignorance. 
The domain I propose to explore can be indicated by a question. The ques 
tion is one I have actually raised within the administration at Caltech (and it 
could as well be raised elsewhere). Institutions such as Caltech and others de 
vote much energy and effort and talent to the advancement of science. We raise 
funds, we provide laboratories, 
we train students, and so on. In so doing 
we 
apply essentially only one criterion?that it be good science as science?that the 
work be imaginative, skillfully done, in the forefront of the field. Is that, as we 
approach the end of the twentieth century, enough? As social institutions, do 
Caltech and others have an obligation to be concerned about the likely con 
sequences of the research they foster? And if so, how might they implement such 
a 
responsibility? 
For reasons which probably need no elaboration Caltech has been more than 
reluctant to come to grips with this question. And, indeed, it just may be?and 
I say this with real sorrow?that scientists are simply not the people qualified to 
cope with such a question. The basic tactic of natural science is analysis: frag 
ment a phenomenon into its components, analyze each part and process in isola 
tion, and thereby derive an understanding of the subject. In physics, chemistry, 
even biology, this tactic has worked splendidly. 
To answer my question, however, the focus must not be inward but out 
ward, not narrowed but broadened. The focus must be on all the ties of the 
sciences to society and culture and on the impact of scientific knowledge and 
technological advancement on all human, indeed all planetary, life. 
Consider as an instance the recombinant DNA issue. The natural tendency 
of the scientist, if he will admit this a problem, is to break it down, to decom 
pose it into individually analyzable situations. If there is a danger, quantitate it: 
what is the numerical chance of the organisms escaping, of their colonizing the 
gut, of their penetrating the intestinal epithelium, of their causing disease 
(what disease)? If you point out that there is a nearly infinite set of possible 
scenarios of misfortune?that accidents do happen and in unpredictable ways, 
that humans do err, that bacterial or viral cultures do become contaminated, 
that indeed aspects of this technology involve inherently unpredictable con 
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sequence and hence are not susceptible to quantitative analysis?you are re 
garded as unscientific. 
The consequences of the interaction of known but foreign gene products 
with the complex contents of a bacterial cell would be difficult enough to pre 
dict, much less the consequences of the interactions of unknown gene products, 
as produced in "shotgun" experiments. Some of these consequences may well 
modify, in unpredictable ways, the likelihood of the organism's survival or per 
sistence in various environments, its potential toxicity for a host or nearby life 
forms. It 
may alter, for instance, an organism's survival in an animal intestine, 
contrary to our expectations, for we have presumed that we know all factors 
important for survival there and that no new successful adaptations could 
emerge. 
For complex reasons, consideration of the potential hazards from organisms 
with recombinant DNA has focused upon immediate medical concerns. That 
these organisms with unpredictable properties might have impact upon any of 
the numerous microbiological processes which are important components of our 
life support systems is simply dismissed as improbable. The fact that these 
organisms are evolutionary innovations and have within themselves, as do all 
living forms, the capacity (if they survive) for their own unpredictable future 
evolutionary development is ignored, or dismissed as mystical. 
If you point out that the recombinant DNA issue simply cannot be ef 
fectively considered in isolation but must be viewed in perspective and in a 
larger context as a possible precursor to future technologies available to many 
elements of society (including totalitarian governments, the military, and terror 
ist factions) your remarks are regarded as irrelevant to science. 
There is an intensity of focus in the scientific perspective which is both its 
immediate strength and its ultimate weakness. The scientific approach focuses 
rigorously upon the problem at hand, ignoring as irrelevant the antecedents of 
motive and the prospectives of consequence. 
Viewed objectively such an approach can only make sense if either (1) the 
consequences are always trivial, which is patently untrue, or (2) the con 
sequences are always benign, that is, if the acquisition of knowledge, of any 
knowledge at any time, is always good, a proposition one might find hard to 
defend, or (3) the dangers and difficulties inherent in any attempt to restrict the 
acquisition of knowledge are so great as to make the unhindered pursuit of 
science the lesser evil. 
In thinking about the impacts of science, we should, perhaps, reflect upon 
the inverse of the uncertainty principle. Perhaps it might be called the certainty 
principle. The uncertainty principle is concerned with the inevitable impact of 
the observer upon the observed, which thereby alters the observed. Conversely, 
there is an effect of the observed upon the observer. The discovery of new 
knowledge, the addition of new certainty, which correspondingly diminishes 
the domain of uncertainty and mystery, inevitably alters the perspective of the 
observer. We do not see the world with the same eyes as a Newton or a Des 
cartes, or even a Faraday or a Rutherford. 
The acquisition of a discipline sharpens our vision in its domain, but too 
frequently it seems also to blind us to other concerns. Thus immersion in the 
world of science, with its store of accumulated and substantiated fact, can make 
the participant intolerant of, and impatient with the uncertainties and non 
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reproducibilities of the human world. Engrossed in the search for knowledge, 
scientists tend to adopt the position that more knowledge is the key to the solu 
tion to human problems. They may not see that the uses we make of knowledge 
or the ways in which we organize to use knowledge can, as well, be the limiting 
factors to the human condition, and they forget that even within science our 
knowledge and our theories are always human constructs. Moreover, we should 
always remember (lest we become too secure and even smug) that our knowl 
edge and our theories are ever incomplete. 
Of Dubious Merit 
To make this discussion more specific let me consider three examples of 
research that I personally consider to be, on balance, of dubious merit. One is in 
an area of rather applied research, the second in a very speculative but surely 
basic area, and the third in the domain of biom?dical research, which we most 
often conceive to be wholly benign. 
The first I would cite is current research upon improved means for isotope 
fractionation. In one technique, one attempts to use sophisticated lasers5 to acti 
vate 
selectively one isotope of a set. I do not wish to discuss the technology but 
rather the likely consequence of its success. To be sure, there are benign experi 
ments that would be facilitated by the availability of less expensive, pure iso 
topes. For some years I wanted to do an experiment with oxygen 18 but was 
always deterred by the cost. 
But does anyone doubt that the most immediate application of isotope frac 
tionation techniques would be the separation of uranium isotopes? This country 
has recently chosen to defer, at least, if not in fact to abandon, the plutonium 
economy and the breeder reactor because of well-founded concern that pluto 
nium would inevitably find its way into weapons. We are thus left with uranium 
fueled reactors. But uranium 235 can also be made into a bomb. Its use for 
power is safer only because of the difficulty in the separation of uranium 235 
from the more abundant uranium 238. If we supersede the complex technology 
of Oak Ridge, if we devise quick and ingenious means for isotope separation, 
then one of the last defenses against nuclear terror will be breached. Is the 
advantage worth the price? 
A second instance I would cite of research of dubious merit, and one prob 
ably even more tendentious than the first, relates to the proposal to search for 
and contact extraterrestrial intelligence.6 Recent proposals suggest that, using 
advanced electronic and computer technology, we could monitor a million 
"channels" in a likely region of the electromagnetic spectrum, "listening" over 
several years for signals with an "unnatural" regularity or complexity. 
I am concerned about the psychological impact upon humanity of such con 
tact. We have had the technical capacity to search for such postulated in 
telligence for less than two decades, an instant in cosmic terms. If such 
intelligent societies exist and if we can "hear" them, we are almost certain to be 
technologically less advanced and thus distinctly inferior in our development to 
theirs. What would be the impact of such knowledge upon human values? 
Copernicus was a deep cultural shock to man. The universe did not revolve 
about us. But God works in mysterious ways and we could still be at the center 
of importance in His universe. Darwin was a deep cultural shock to man. But 
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.9 on Tue, 16 Dec 2014 00:43:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
30 ROBERT L. SINSHEIMER 
we were still number one. If we are closer to the animals than we thought 
before, and through them to the rocks and the sea, it does not really devalue 
man to revalue matter. To 
really be number two, 
or number 37, or in truth to 
be wholly outclassed, an inferior species, inferior on our own turf of intellect 
and creativity and imagination, would, I think, be very hard for humanity. 
The impact of more advanced cultures upon less advanced has almost in 
variably been disastrous to the latter. We are well acquainted with such impacts 
as the Spanish upon the Aztecs and Incas or the British and French upon the 
Polynesians and Hawaiians. These instances were, however, compounded by 
physical interventions (warfare) and the introduction of novel diseases. I want to 
emphasize the purely cultural shock. Hard learned skills determinant of social 
usefulness and positions become quickly obsolete. Less advanced cultures 
quickly become derivative, seeking technological handouts. What would hap 
pen to our essential tradition of self-reliance? Would we be reduced to seekers of 
cosmic handouts? 
The distance of the contacted society might, to some degree, mitigate its 
consequent impact. A contact with a round trip communication time of ten 
years would have much more effect than one with a thousand years. The likeli 
hood of either is, however, a priori, unknown. Nor is it inconceivable that an 
advanced society could devise means for communication faster than light. 
The proponents of such interactions have considered the consequences 
briefly. In a 427-page book Communication with Extraterrestrial Intelligence1 six 
teen pages comprise a chapter entitled "Consequences of Contact." Opinion 
therein ranges from "Our obligation is, I feel, to stress that in any sensible way 
this problem has no danger for human society. I believe we can give a full 
guarantee of this" to "If we come in contact with some superior civilization this 
would mean the end of our civilization, although that might take a while. Our 
period of culture would be finished." 
How and by whom should such a momentous decision8 be made?one that 
will clearly, if successful, have an impact upon all humanity? Somehow I can 
not believe it should be left to a small group of enthusiastic radioastronomers. 
My concern here does not extend so far that I would abolish the science of 
astronomy. If the astronomers in the course of their science come across phe 
nomena that can only be understood as the product of intelligent activity, so be 
it. But I do not believe that is the same as deliberately setting out to look for 
such activity with overt pretensions of social benefit. 
The third example of research I consider of dubious merit concerns the 
aging process. I would suggest this subject exemplifies in supreme degree the 
eternal conflict between the welfare of the individual and the welfare of society 
and, indeed, the species. Obviously, as individuals, we would prefer youth and 
continued life. Equally obviously, on a finite planet, extended individual life 
must restrict the production of new individuals and that renewal which pro 
vides the vitality of our species. 
The logic is inexorable. In a finite world the end of death means the end of 
birth. Who will be the last born? 
If we propose such research we must take seriously the possibility of its 
success. The impact of a major extension of the human life span upon our entire 
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social order, upon the life styles, mores, and adaptations associated with "three 
score and ten," upon the carrying capacity of a planet already facing over 
population would be devastating. At this time we hardly need such enormous 
additional problems. Research on aging seems to me to exemplify the wrong 
research on the wrong problem in the wrong era. We need that talent elsewhere. 
Is Restraint Feasible? 
If one concedes, however reluctantly, that restraint of some directions of 
scientific inquiry is desirable, it is appropriate to ask if it is feasible and, if so, at 
what cost. 
Some of my colleagues, not only in biology but in other fields of science as 
well, have indicated to me that they too increasingly sense that our curiosity, 
our 
exploration of nature, may unwittingly lead us into an irretrievable disaster. 
But they argue we have no alternative.9 Such a position is, of course, a self 
fulfilling prophecy. 
I would differentiate among what might be called physical feasibility, logical 
feasibility, and political feasibility. 
I believe that actual physical restraint is in principle feasible. There are two 
evident avenues of control: the power of the purse and access to instruments. 
Control of funding is indeed already a powerful means for control of the direc 
tions of inquiry for better or worse. To the extent that there exists a multiplicity 
of sources of support, such control is porous and incomplete, but it is clearly a 
first line of restraint. 
Research today cannot be done with household tools. It is difficult to imag 
ine, for instance, any serious research on aging that would not require the use of 
radioisotopes or an ultracentrifuge 
or an electron 
microscope. The use of iso 
topes is already regulated for other reasons. Access to electron microscopes 
could, in principle, be regulated, albeit at very real cost to our current concepts 
of intellectual freedom. 
An immediately related, important aspect of any policy of restraint concerns 
the distinctions to be made about the nature of research. Can we logically dif 
ferentiate research on aging from general basic biologic studies? I expect we 
cannot in any simple, absolute sense. Yet obviously the people who established 
the National Institute of Aging must have believed that there is a class of studies 
which deserves specific support under that rubric. Indeed, distinctions of this 
sort are made all the time by the various institutes of National Institutes of 
Health in deciding which grant applications are potentially eligible for their 
particular support. Pragmatically, and with some considerable margin of error, 
such distinctions can be and are made. 
It is frequently claimed that the "unpredictability" of the outcome of re 
search makes its restraint, for social or other purpose, illogical and indeed futile. 
However, the unpredictability of a research outcome is not an absolute but is 
both quantitatively and qualitatively variable. 
In more applied research within a field with well-defined general principles, 
the range of possible outcomes is surely circumscribed. In more fundamental 
research, in wholly new fields remote from prior human experience?as in the 
This content downloaded from 131.215.225.9 on Tue, 16 Dec 2014 00:43:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
32 ROBERT L. SINSHEIMER 
cosmos, or the subatomic world, or the core of the planet?wholly novel phe 
nomena may be discovered. But, for instance, even in a fundamental science 
such as biology, most of the overt phenomena of life have been long known. 
The basic principles of heredity were discovered by Mendel a century ago 
and were elaborated by Morgan and others early in this century. The under 
standing of genetic mechanism, the reduction of genetics to chemistry, had to 
await the advent of molecular biology. This understanding of mechanism has 
now provided the potential for human interventions, for genetic engineering, 
but it has not significantly modified our comprehension of the genetic basis of 
biological process.10 
The path of modern biology will surely lead to further understanding of 
biological mechanism, with subsequent application to medicine and agriculture 
(and accompanying social impact). But it would seem likely that only within the 
central nervous system may there be the potential for wholly novel?and corre 
spondingly wholly unpredictable?process. Even there, the facts of human psy 
chology and the subjective realities of human consciousness have long been 
familiar to us, albeit the underlying mechanisms are indeed obscure. 
Political feasibility is, of course, another question. The constituency most 
immediately affected is, of course, the scientific. And despite our protestations 
and alarms this community does have real political influence. It would seem 
unlikely to me that a policy of scientific restraint could be adopted in any sector 
unless a major portion of the scientific community came to believe it desirable. 
For this to happen, that community will clearly have to become far more 
alert to, and aware of, and responsible for the consequences of their activities. 
The best discipline is self-discipline. Scientists are keenly sensitive to the evalu 
ations of their peers. The scientific community and the leaders of our scientific 
and technical institutions will have to develop a collective conscience; they will 
have to let it be known certain types of research are looked upon askance, much 
as biological warfare research is today; it needs to be understood that such re 
search will not be weighed in considerations of tenure and promotion; societies 
need to agree not to sponsor symposia on such topics. All of these and similar 
measures short of law could indeed be very effective. 
I am well aware of the dangers implicit in such forms of cultural restraint. 
But I think we really must look at the dangers we face in the absence of self 
restraint. Do we accept only the restraint of catastrophe? 
If we are to consider this position, we must do so in a forthright manner. We 
must be willing to explore the vistas exposed if we lower conventional taboos 
and sanctions. We may not at first enjoy what we see, but at least we will have a 
better perception of the available alternatives. Any attempt to limit the freedom 
of scientific inquiry will surely involve what will appear, at least at first, to be 
quite arbitrary distinctions?judgmental decisions, the establishment of bound 
aries in gray and amorphous terrain. These are, however, familiar processes in 
our 
society, in the courts, in the legislatures. Indeed, most of us are familiar 
with such problems in our educational activities. The selection of new faculty, 
the award of tenure, the assignment of grades are clearly judgmental decisions. 
In science we try with some success to elude the necessity for such very 
human judgments. Indeed, one suspects that many persons go into science pre 
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cisely to avoid the necessity for such complex decisions?in search of a domain 
of unique and unequivocal answers of enduring validity. And it is painful to see 
the 
sanctuary invaded. 
Admittedly it is difficult to achieve consensus on the criteria for judgmental 
decisions. Such consensus is all the more difficult in the sphere of international 
activities such as science which involve participants from diverse cultures and 
traditions. 
Conversely there are many persons who prefer the more common, perhaps 
the more human world of ambiguity and compromise and temporally valid 
judgments and who resist the seemingly brutal, life and death, cataclysmic 
types of decision increasingly imposed upon society by the works of science. 
And science and scientists cannot stand wholly aloof from these latter di 
lemmas?for science is a human activity and scientists live in the human so 
ciety. We cannot expect the adaptation to be wholly one-sided. 
Even if, at best, we can only slow the rate of acquisition of certain areas of 
knowledge, such a tactic would give us more time to prepare for social adapta 
tion?if we mobilize ourselves to use that time. 
The Case for Restraint 
The view one exposes by lifting that sanction we label freedom of inquiry is 
frankly gloomy. It would seem that we are asked to make thorny decisions and 
delicate differentiations, to relinquish long-cherished rights of free inquiry, to 
forego clear prospects of technological progress. And it would seem that all 
these concessions stem ultimately from recognition of human frailty and from 
recognition of the limitations of human rationality and foresight, of human 
adaptability and even good will. Just such recognitions have already spawned 
many of our institutions and professions?religions, the law, government, 
United Nations?yet all of these are as imperfect as the world they are designed 
to restrain and improve. 
At each level of human activity, whether individual, group, or national, we 
continually struggle to find acceptable compromises between the freedom to 
pursue varied courses and goals and the conflicts that arise when one person's 
actions run 
contrary to another's. In a crude sense the greater the power avail 
able to an entity, the more limitations must be imposed upon its freedom if 
conflict is to be averted. Ideally such limits are internalized through education 
and conscience, but we all understand the inadequacy of that process. 
In short, we must pay a price for freedom, for the toleration of diversity, 
even 
eccentricity. That price may require that we forego certain technologies, 
even certain lines of inquiry where the likely application is incompatible with 
the maintenance of other freedoms. If this is so and if we can recognize and 
understand this, perhaps 
we can, as scientists, be more accepting. 
Some will argue that knowledge simply provides us with more options and 
thus that the decision point should not be at the acquisition of knowledge but at 
its application. 
Such a view, however ideal, overlooks the difficulty inherent in the restric 
tion of application of new knowledge, once that knowledge has become available 
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in a free society. Does anyone really believe, for instance, that knowledge per 
mitting an extension of the human life span would not be applied once it were 
available? 
One must also recognize again that the very acquisition of knowledge can 
change both the perceptions and the values of the acquirer. Could, for instance, 
deeper knowledge of the realities of human genetics affect our commitment to 
democracy? 
It may be argued that the cost, however it may be measured, of impeding 
research would be greater to a society than the cost of impeding application. 
Perhaps so. This issue could be debated, but it must be debated in realistic 
terms with regard for the nature of real people and real society and with full 
understanding that knowledge is indeed power. 
Although the nature of the measures necessary to restrict the application of 
knowledge has seldom been analyzed, the measures needed would surely be 
dependent upon the size of investment required to apply the knowledge, as well 
as on the form of and the need for the potential benefits of the knowledge, 
among other things. The compatibility of such restrictive measures with the 
principles of a democratic society would need to be considered. Restriction of 
nuclear power may be a case in point. 
Alvin Weinberg has developed the concept of the technological fix as the 
simple solution to cut the Gordian knot of complex social problems. However, 
we seem to be discovering that the application of one technological fix seems to 
lead us into another technological fix. For example, the development of antibiot 
ics and other triumphs of modern medicine has led to the tyranny of over 
population. In efforts to cope with overpopulation by more intensive 
agriculture, we develop pesticides, herbicides and other chemicals which in 
crease the level of environmental 
carcinogenesis. And so 
on. 
The moral is that we cannot ignore the social and cultural context within 
which the technology is deployed. In retrospect we can see that in the cultural 
and social context of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries the 
consequences of technological innovation were most often benign. Whether be 
cause of change in the society and culture or change in the nature and ef 
fectiveness of technology, at some time in the twentieth century the balance 
began to shift and by now our addiction to technology begins to assume an 
unpleasant cast. 
We are indeed addicted to technology. We rely ever more upon it and thus 
become its servant as well as its master. It has led to human populations in 
supportable without its aid. Further, new technologies shape our perceptions; 
they spawn expectations of change or stir deep fears of disaster. They dissociate 
us from the past and becloud the shape of the future. Even the oldest boundary 
conditions of humanity fall as we leave the planet and as we plan to reshape our 
genes. 
Our academic institutions and our professional societies foster and promote 
science. To some degree they also have concern for its consequences, but it is a 
minor aspect. The principle that one should separate agencies which promote 
and agencies which regulate may apply here. 
But where then is the balance, the necessary check to the force of scientific 
progress? Is the accumulation of knowledge unique among human activities? 
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an 
unmitigated good that needs no counterweight? Perhaps that was true when 
science was young and impotent, but hardly now. Yet we lack the institutional 
mechanisms for 
regulation. 
Our experience with constraint upon science has hardly been encouraging. 
From the Inquisition to Lysenko such constraint has been the work of bigots 
and charlatans. Obviously, if it is to be done to a good purpose, any restraint 
must be informed, both as to science and as to the larger society on which 
science impacts. 
The acquisition of knowledge is a human, a social, enterprise. If we, 
through the relentless, single-minded pursuit of new knowledge so destabilize 
society as to render it incapable?or unwilling?to continue to support the sci 
entific enterprise, then we will have, through our obsession, defeated ourselves. 
At Caltech and the many other academic institutions, we have now, cultural 
ly, cloned Galileo a millionfold. We have nurtured this Galilean clone well; we 
award prizes and honors to those most like the original. No doubt this clone has 
been most beneficial for humanity, but perhaps there is a time for Galileos. 
Perhaps we need in this time to start another clone. 
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